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The growing importance of China in Africa today makes the examination of the 
history of Communist China‘s foreign policy towards Africa a necessary undertaking. In 
recent years, there has been an escalation of attention paid to China‘s political and 
economic role in developing nations, with particular attention granted to China‘s policies 
in African countries. However, China did not just begin to pay attention to Africa at the 
close of the twentieth century, and it is the purpose of this paper to look at the beginnings 
of these policies. Chronologically, this paper focuses on the birth and early evolution of 
China‘s foreign policy towards Africa, namely from the years 1954 to 1964. These dates 
represent not only the beginning, but also a significant change in China‘s foreign policies 
towards Africa. While many of the policies adopted and adapted by Communist China 
during this period were to encompass the whole of the emerging third world, this paper 
 vii 
focuses on Africa, and in particular Zambia for more specific examples. China played an 
important role in the newly independent nations of Africa in the early 1960s, and it 
continues to play a significant, and often controversial, role there today.  
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The growing importance of China in Africa today makes the examination of the 
history of Communist China‘s foreign policy towards Africa a necessary undertaking. In 
recent years, scholars, journalists, and other observers have paid growing attention to 
China‘s political and economic role in developing nations, focusing special attention on 
China‘s policies in African countries. In the past decade, China has increased its political 
presence in Africa as it has provided economic aid and assistance. As the Chinese 
government generously develops infrastructure such as roads and hospitals, Chinese 
businesses have bought mines and access to other natural resources like oil and timber 
and have flooded African markets with cheap Chinese consumer goods. However, China 
did not just begin to pay attention to Africa at the close of the twentieth century and it is 
the purpose of this paper to look at the beginnings of these policies.  
Following the Communist Revolution of 1949, China became an increasingly 
important presence on the world stage.  Although not yet the world power of the 
contemporary era, the West still regarded China as an important player in the global 
chess game of the Cold War. Countries such as the United States and Great Britain 
watched with avid attention as Chinese officials developed new policies, both domestic 
and those regarding foreign relations. Of particular concern was China‘s policy toward 
the newly coined ―third world‖1 and its effects on Cold War political alignment. While 
                                                 
1  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the use of the term ―third world‖ 
became irrelevant and, to some, demeaning towards the countries to which it referred. However, 
while it is now generally more acceptable to use such terminology as the ―developing world‖ or 
―global south,‖ this paper will continue to use ―third world‖ without quotations. This is due to not 
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there were many dynamics involved in the establishment of China‘s foreign policy, this 
paper argues that two factors stand out as being the most crucial in the development of 
policies towards Africa. These include China‘s self-identification as a third world nation 
and the importance of political alignment in the Cold War. 
 Chronologically, this paper focuses on the birth and early evolution of China‘s 
foreign policy towards Africa, namely from the years 1954 to 1964. The 1955 Bandung 
Conference was a seminal moment in the development of Asian-African relations. 
China‘s newly formed communist government‘s stated aims at the conference differed 
greatly from the policies that it would adapt in the coming decade. What instead would 
develop in 1957 was the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, which had the 
effect of increasing the significance of China‘s role in Africa, replacing a relationship 
seemingly based on equality with one based implicitly on power relations through the 
establishment of diplomatic relations and the beginnings of economic aid. While many of 
the policies adopted and adapted by Communist China during this period were to 
encompass the whole of the emerging third world, this paper focuses on Africa, and in 
particular Zambia for more specific examples. China played an important role in the 
newly independent nations of Africa in the early 1960s, and it continues to play a 
significant, and often controversial, role there today.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
only the popularity and widespread use of the division during the period discussed, but also 
because this was how countries, often proudly, referred to themselves during the Cold War as it 
meant they had no particular political alignment. 
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Chinese Foreign Policy, 1949-1954 
 On October 1, 1949, the new People's Republic of China was faced with a huge 
domestic agenda. The need for political and economic stability at home did not mean that 
China could ignore foreign policy, however, with geopolitical concerns immediately 
becoming a priority. China's foreign policy in its early years, namely from 1949 to 1954, 
focused on the its neighbors and was a much different type of foreign policy from that 
which developed in subsequent years towards Africa. The first major foreign policy 
concern of China was Korea, with the war in Korea breaking out on June 25, 1950, less 
than a year after the Communist Party won control of the government.  
 In his book Mao's China and the Cold War, Chen Jian discusses China's role in 
the Korean War. Chen explains that the impetus for the war lay solely on the shoulders of 
Kim Il-sung, with the Soviet Union reluctantly providing assistance as Stalin feared a 
direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean 
peninsula. Stalin encouraged Kim to request assistance from Beijing so as to share the 
responsibility but Mao and the CCP were hesitant. In the end, however, Chen explains 
that Mao came to Kim's assistance ―because Mao and his comrades were eager to revive 
China's central position on the international scene through supporting revolutionary 
movements in other countries (especially in East Asia).‖
2
 
 China's involvement in the Korean War was directly hinged on support from the 
Soviet Union. However, after the United States became involved, as Stalin had feared 
they would, Soviet Union support quickly dwindled. This was the first major test of the 
                                                 
2  Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University pf North Carolina Press, 
2001), 54. 
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Sino-Soviet alliance, a relationship that would continually be tried until the eventual split. 
In the end though, China's decision to assist Kim gave Stalin a more favorable opinion of 
Mao's CCP and he ―became more willing to commit Soviet financial and technological 
resources to China's economic reconstruction.‖
3
 It is clear that immediate foreign policy 
concerns for China were directly related to domestic concerns, including fostering its 
relationship with the Soviet Union for strategic and economic motivations, as well as 
regional concerns over the stability and support for revolution in East Asia. However, 
China's early foreign policy did not directly translate into its foreign policy towards the 
developing world and Africa in particular. Although some motivations remained the 
same, China‘s foreign policy towards Africa focused on a strategic self-depreciation of its 
role in global affairs, rather than an attempt at regional leadership. 
                                                 
3  Ibid., 60. 
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Strategic Self Depreciation 
 
In his book, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, political 
scientist Crawford Young examines the reasons why many African states failed following 
independence. In order to accomplish his goals, he first explains the major components of 
a modern nation state and how scholars can use the nation state in analyses of both 
domestic and foreign policy. While the focus of the rest of his book is on Africa, his 
explanation of the state as ―an elusive and complex prey‖ is a useful description for any 
modern nation state, as is his description of its major components.4 
 The attributes that Young identifies in the modern nation state include: territory, 
population, sovereignty (an important concept in the era of decolonization), power, and 
law. However, Young also examines the state as a nation, as an international actor, and as 
an idea. This definition of a state, the concept of a state‘s self-identification being 
exposed, particularly regarding its ―role as a member of an international system.‖5 How 
the state, both in the terms of the people who call themselves members or citizens of the 
state and those who make the decisions at the highest levels of government, chooses to be 
seen in this international arena definitively determines its foreign policy and its relations 
with other states. 
 The complex geopolitical situation of the Cold War is a poignant example of the 
importance of this self-identification, as for the first time nation-states were categorized 
into ―worlds.‖ In 1952, economist and demographer Alfred Sauvy published an article in 
                                                 
4  Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1994), 13. 
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the French magazine L’Observateur coining the term ―third world.‖ Sauvy used the term 
to refer to those countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that, as they achieved 
political independence from colonial powers, had not yet determined a political alignment 
with the ―first world‖ of the United States and Western Europe or the ―second world‖ of 
the Soviet Union. This indirect reference to the third estate of the French Revolution 
implied that the third world was taken advantage of much like the peasantry was in 
eighteenth century France. 
 The images that the United States and Soviet Union portrayed to the rest of the 
world during this time were paramount to their policy. Perhaps the best example of this 
image game can be seen in the ―Kitchen Debate‖ at the opening of the 1959 American 
National Exhibition in Moscow. Here, the United States strove to be viewed as more 
progressive than the Soviet Union in an example of the great debate between capitalism 
versus socialism. No matter what was happening internally in each of these countries, 
each sought to appear to be more economically viable and politically stable than the 
other.  
 However, China chose a much different approach in the image game of the Cold 
War. In their book United Front Against Imperialism, G.P. Deshpande and H.K. Gupta 
explain, ―Following the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China, the Chinese 
world view reflected the objective situation in which China found herself.‖6 The situation 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s was one of newfound importance. During this period, 
China focused on the United States and the West as the enemy, while maintaining a 
                                                                                                                                                 
5  Ibid., 21. 
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precarious, yet at this point still largely positive relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, in a form of strategic self-depreciation, separate from its desire to once again 
be a leader in East Asia, China sought to align itself with the developing nations of the 
third world.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6  G. P. Deshpande and H. K. Gupta, United Front against Imperialism China's Foreign 
Policy in Africa (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1986), 16. 
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The Bandung Conference of 1955 
 
The new members of the third world did not necessarily want to align themselves 
politically with the United States or the Soviet Union. Some of the third world was 
beginning to self-identify as non-aligned nations and in April of 1954, Indonesia 
proposed that a conference of Asian and African nations convene to discuss issues 
concerning these nations.   The Bandung Conference, which took place from the April 18 
to April 24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, was the first large scale meeting of Africa and 
Asian nations, many of which were newly independent and some still under colonial rule. 
In total, twenty-nine countries sent delegates, many of which represented newly 
independent nations, such as India and Pakistan, but some of which also represented 
nations that had not yet gained full independence, such as the Gold Coast, soon to be the 
independent nation of Ghana. 
 The agenda of the conference was part of a greater movement culminated in the 
conference and the subsequent formation of the Non-Alignment Movement. In his 
description of the proceedings of the conference, Secretary General of the Indian Council 
for World Affairs A. Appadorai stated the conferences aims as: 
(1) Economic Co-operation- It was understood that this would include a 
discussion on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; (2) Cultural Co-
operation; (3) Human Rights and Self-Determination- Under this item, the 
questions of Palestine and racialism would be discussed; (4) Problems of 
Dependent Peoples- This would include a discussion on Tunisia, Algeria 
and Morocco; and (5) Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation- The 
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question of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament would be 
discussed under this item.7 
More broadly, the conference had the implicit goals of creating a coalition against 
imperialism. With the creation of the United Nations charter and the establishment of the 
principle of ―national self-determination,‖ it seemed inevitable that the colonies of 
Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean would eventually be granted sovereignty. However, the 
political realities of the Cold War left many of the newly independent nations wary of the 
role that the United States or the Soviet Union hoped to play in their independence.  
 Therefore, while the Bandung Conference was deemed a success and a ―milestone 
on the road to peace and progress‖8 in its achievements of its stated aims, its legacy was 
the birth of the ideas that formed the Non-Alignment Movement. The idea for the 
movement came out of speech given by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi, in 
which he laid out the ―Panch Shila,‖ or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for Sino-
Indian relations.9 Yet, while the Non-Alignment movement, which today has 118 
members, was born out of a discussion of the relationship between India and China, it 
was never signed by the Chinese, and today they still only hold observer status. 
 Although China was not yet the world power that it would become in the twenty-
first century, the communist revolution of 1949 meant that much of the world, 
particularly many officials in the United States, viewed China as more of a member of the 
                                                 
7  A. Appadorai and Affairs Indian Council of World, The Bandung Conference (New 
Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955), 6. 
8  Ibid., 32. 
9  Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics; China and the Afro-Asian People's [Sic] 
Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 27 (Cambridge: East 
Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1968), 3. 
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second world, rather than a member of the third world, and of a level of concern similar 
to that of the Soviet Union. Yet China, with the full backing of Nehru under the auspices 
of the ―Panch Shila,‖ and as an Asian nation not a communist nation, was a key player at 
the conference. China‘s delegate to the conference, Zhou En-Lai,10 played a very visible, 
and at times controversial, role in Bandung. China‘s attempts to establish a distinct 
foreign policy are first evidenced in their participation in the 1954 Geneva conference. 
The conference sought to establish peace in French Indo-China and in Vietnam and was 
where Zhou En-Lai, as the Chinese delegate, first established himself as ―a tough but 
reasonable negotiator.‖11 It was also the first visit of a communist leader to a non-
communist country during peacetime. Five years after the Communist Revolution, China 
had begun to seriously develop its foreign policy agenda beyond the East Asian region. 
 Regarding China's foreign policy towards Africa, there was one issue in particular 
that the Chinese government felt it could not ignore when considering diplomatic 
relations: the issue of Taiwan. This issue was first discussed at the Asian Nations 
Conference, held just prior to Bandung from the April 6 to the April 10, 1955. While the 
conference was more unofficial and less influential than Bandung, it had the participation 
of both the Soviet Union and China, and ―there can be little doubt that the meetings in 
India and Indonesia were linked in the sense that the organizers of the New Delhi 
meeting hoped that its deliberations would influence the forthcoming discussions in 
                                                 
10  ―Zhou‖ is also sometimes spelled ―Chou.‖ Zhou En-Lai was the first prime minister of 
the People‘s Republic of China, where he served from October 1, 1949 until his death on January 
8, 1976. He was also the foreign minister from 1949 to 1958 and was a key player in the 
communist party‘s rise to power and in the Cultural Revolution. 
11  Neuhauser, Third World Politics; China and the Afro-Asian People's [Sic] Solidarity 
Organization, 1957-1967. 
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Bandung.‖12 The conference, heavily influenced by the participation of the communist 
powers China and the Soviet Union, discussed issues similar to those advanced at 
Bandung, but China placed particular emphasis on UN recognition of the government in 
Peking over the government in Taipei. The diplomatic recognition of one capital over 
another would prove to be a crucial culmination of Chinese-African relations in 1971, as 
African nations played the deciding role in the People‘s Republic of China‘s 
establishment as the internationally recognized government of China.13 
 Later at Bandung, Zhou showed his deft diplomatic skills in two speeches that 
laid the foundation of China‘s foreign policy towards the third world. The first speech 
was originally intended as his keynote speech for the conference but was scrapped for a 
new speech with the first one handed out in mimeographed form to all of the delegates. 
This first speech focused on China‘s commonalities with the other nations of Asia and 
Africa, particularly in terms of subjection to colonial rule. Zhou‘s speech stated 
passionately, ―Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our 
destiny placed in the hands of others…Suffering from the same cause and struggling for 
the same aim.‖14 The speech went on to emphasize, ―The majority of our Asian and 
African countries, including China, are still very backward economically owing to the 
long period of colonial domination.‖15 China‘s reference to itself as a post-colonial nation 
                                                 
12  Ibid., 4. 
13  Wei Liang-Tsai discusses the importance of this issue in detail in the 1982 book Peking 
Versus Taipei in Africa: 1960-1978. It must be noted, however, that the book was published by 
The Asia and World Institute of Taiwan, and has a very clear objective and obvious bias in its 
interpretation. There has not been a non-partisan account of the role of Africa in the recognition 
of Peking.  
14  Zhou En-Lai, China and the Asian-African Conference: Documents (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1979), 10. 
15  Ibid., 13. 
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was controversial, as many felt that China had not been subject to the same level of 
colonial domination as many of the other nations present. This was particularly 
significant since China's only true colonial holdings were Hong Kong and Macau. Yet, 
more importantly, this was an crucial example of China‘s strategy of self-depreciation as 
the cornerstone of its third world foreign policy.  
 The skepticism of other delegates about Zhou En-Lai‘s first speech and his 
references to China as a ―semi-colonial society‖16 led Zhou to draft a supplementary 
speech that he gave orally as the first was distributed. This speech took a more definitive 
stance on China‘s role in the Cold War geopolitical situation. Here, Zhou stated: 
The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel. 
We Communists do not hide the fact that we believe in communism and 
that we consider socialist system a good system. There is no need at this 
Conference to publicize one‘s ideology and the political system of one‘s 
country.17 
His first speech never mentioned the political ideology of the Chinese government, yet 
the second speech emphasized the point from the outset. The political realities of the 
Cold War made China‘s unique interpretation of Marxism impossible to ignore. 
 Additionally, the first speech did not mention the controversy surround Taipei. 
However, Zhou‘s less rehearsed second speech makes it obvious that others had pressed 
him to address the issue. Regarding Taipei, he stated: 
                                                 
16  Ibid., 14. 
17  Ibid., 21. 
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As for the tension created solely by the United States in the area of 
Taiwan, we could have submitted for deliberation by the Conference an 
item such as the proposal made by the Soviet Union for seeking a 
settlement through an international conference. The will of the Chinese 
people to liberate their own territory Taiwan and the coastal islands is a 
just one. It is entirely a matter of our internal affairs and the exercise of 
our sovereignty…But we did not do all this, because otherwise our 
Conference would be dragged into disputes about all of these problems 
without any solution.18 
This was an important departure from the emphasis that Zhou had placed on Taiwan at 
the preceding conference. The issue had not even made the agenda of Bandung, as Zhou 
pointed out, yet he felt pressured to bring it up in his supplementary speech. Despite 
China‘s desire to keep the matter an internal issue, Zhou‘s references at Bandung 
foreshadow the important role that diplomatic recognition, especially in the United 
Nations, would play in relations between China and the third world, particularly Africa. 
 Despite the importance of these two now seemingly unavoidable issues of 
political ideology and the recognition of Taipei, the original strategy of self-depreciation 
remained deeply embedded in the rhetoric of the second speech. Here, Zhou continued to 
emphasize China‘s equality with other developing, newly independent nations. He asked 
of his audience after explaining China‘s definitive communist stance: ―Is there any basis 
for seeking common ground among us?‖ His answer went back to the intentions of his 
first speech. He stated: 
                                                 
18  Ibid., 22. 
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Yes, there is. The overwhelming majority of the Asian and African 
countries and peoples have suffered and are still suffering from the 
calamities of colonialism. This is acknowledged by all of us. If we seek 
common ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under 
colonialism, it will be very easy for us to have mutual understanding and 
respect, mutual sympathy and support, instead of mutual suspicion and 
fear, mutual exclusion and antagonism.19 
This declaration was coupled with an emphasis that China fully backed the aims and 
proposals of the conference, and Zhou gave an enthusiastic speech on the successes of the 
conference at its conclusion.  
 On the one-year anniversary of Bandung, enthusiasm was still strong among 
many nations, including China, about the joint project that had begun. In a telegraph from 
Zhou to the prime minister of Indonesia in April of 1956, Zhou explained: 
    The Spirit of the Bandung Conference of peaceful coexistence and anti-
colonialism has deeply impressed people from all around the world, 
especially those from Asian and African countries. The resolutions passed 
in the conference have reflected the common desire of the Asian and 
African people to strive for and maintain independence and liberty, uphold 
world peace and promote friendly cooperation. The influence of these 
resolutions are now expanding by the joint efforts of the people from 
Asian and African countries.20 
                                                 
19  Ibid. 
20  FMAPRC: 105-00311-02 
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In honor of the anniversary, nations such as China and Indonesia held a brief ceremony 
commemorating the previous year‘s events and foreshadowing the new organization 
about to be born. 
Establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization 
 
The Bandung Conference laid the ground for the future of China‘s relations with 
the third world. However, this diplomatic strategy based heavily on the self-identification 
of its participants was constantly adapting and evolving according to the current political 
realities of the Cold War and decolonization. The first evidence of this evolution was the 
1957 establishment of the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.), in 
which China, in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union and with continued distrust 
towards the United States, began to take a more revolutionary stance in its foreign 
relations. This growing pressure is evidenced both in the shift internally towards more 
leftist policies in China, which encouraged a more militant stance against the United 
States, as well as in concern over new Soviet technology. The Soviet Union‘s first 
successful earth satellite, Sputnik I, was launched in October of 1957 and its first 
successful intercontinental ballistic missile was launched in November 1957 and ―was 
regarded by the Chinese as a mark of decisive international change in the balance of 
forces between ‗Socialism‘ and ‗imperialism.‘‖21  
 The A.A.P.S.O. was founded at a conference held in Cairo on December 26, 
1957. This gathering of 500 delegates from 43 different entities from various Asian and 
African nations was the largest gathering of its kind. Unlike Bandung, however, the 
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delegates to the conference in Cairo were not representatives of their country, but rather 
of specific organizations, which ―generally reflected the Communist orientation‖ of the 
groups they represented. Despite this orientation, the meeting ―while strongly anti-
imperialist and anticolonialist as well as generally anti-Western in tone, was not, strictly 
speaking, a Communist propaganda forum.‖ 22 For while both the Soviet Union and 
China both had delegations at the conference, the Egyptians also played a prominent role 
in the meetings.23 
 To continue the work of the conference and to continue to promote its objectives, 
the convening delegates founded the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity Organization. The 
A.A.P.S.O. was not made of countries, but rather individual national organizations, 
giving countries not yet independent a place to voice their concerns in the international 
community. The make-up of the A.A.P.S.O. was particularly important for the African 
organizations that joined as they were often still considered illegal in their country of 
origin. This also served to downplay the communist nature of the organization, as the 
main goals of these participants were to promote anticolonial issues, rather than pro-
communist ones. 
 This change in emphasis highlighted the development of relations between China 
and African nations. As John Cooley explains, ―The main advantage that the Chinese 
derived was a series of new footholds and new bases for exchanges with Africa…This 
                                                                                                                                                 
21  Ogunsawo, 15. 
22  Neuhauser, Third World Politics; China and the Afro-Asian People's [Sic] Solidarity 
Organization, 1957-1967, 12. 
23  The Philippines, Turkey, and Pakistan boycotted the conference due to their close 
diplomatic ties with the United States. Washington ―took dim view of the meeting,‖ as described 
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gave the Chinese an opportunity to catch up with the Soviets, who had maintained regular 
diplomatic, consular or commercial contacts in some African countries since the 
1920s.‖24 Beyond the A.A.P.S.O., China sought to promote its own form of militant 
agricultural Marxism, which its promoters believed to be more relevant to the countries 
of Africa than the urban proletariat uprisings of the Marxism of the Soviet Union. It was 
through the A.A.P.S.O. that China first began to promote national liberation movements, 
particularly in nations where it seemed possible for a communist revolution of the 
agricultural peasantry.  
 In this promotion of national liberations struggles in Africa, the first state in 
which China became involved was Egypt. In October of 1956, Britain, France, and Israel 
attacked the Suez Canal following the July decision of the Egyptian government to 
nationalize the Canal when the United States and Great Britain decided not to fund the 
building of the Aswan Dam. The Suez Crisis represented for many African nations the 
neo-imperialist ambitions of the countries of the first world. Claiming support for Egypt 
during this time was synonymous with issuing support for the anticolonialist coalition 
that was gaining prominence through the non-alignment movement. Therefore, China‘s 
open support in the matter was crucial. China‘s support of Egypt during the Suez crisis of 
1956 also laid the ground for similar instances of support around the continent. This 
support was not only in rhetoric, however, but also in more tangible assistance. These 
goods, which included steel as well as monetary support, were the first instances of 
                                                                                                                                                 
by John K. Cooley, East Wind over Africa; Red China's African Offensive (New York: Walker, 
1965), 15. 
24  Ibid., 16. 
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economic aid that would become the trademark of Chinese foreign policy in Africa in the 
coming years.  
 Following on the heels of China's support of Egypt was their support of Algeria. 
The Algerian War of Independence was one of Africa‘s most important decolonization 
struggles. Lasting from November 1954 to March of 1962, it was certainly the longest 
and the bloodiest, with upwards of one million Algerians killed in the fighting. The 
national liberation struggle in Algeria not only affected the Algerians and their French 
colonizers, but also had profound implications for decolonization throughout Africa. It 
served as both an inspiration for other independence movements throughout Africa, as 
well as a great source of concern for British colonial officials. Because of the Algerian 
War, the process of decolonization was rushed in many colonies where independence was 
in the short-term plans of the colonizers, and was even begun without any prior plan for 
the allowance of sovereignty and self-governance in the Belgian Congo – a process that 
proved detrimental to their stability following independence.  
 Like in its support of Cairo in the Suez Crisis, even prior to the establishment of 
the A.A.P.S.O. China had showed unwavering support for the liberation struggle in 
Algeria. Zhou, in his first speech handed out at the Bandung Conference, stated China‘s 
support: 
… we cannot help being aware that the peoples of Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria and other dependent peoples who have been fighting for 
independence have never ceased to be suppressed with violence…One 
should say that now the common desire of the awakened countries and 
peoples of Asia and Africa is to oppose racial discrimination and to 
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demand fundamental human rights, to oppose colonialism and to demand 
for national independence, to firmly defend their own territorial integrity 
and sovereignty.25 
China continued to be supportive throughout the Algerians‘ struggle, and was rewarded 
with their goal of Algeria‘s recognition of the government in Peking immediately 
following their declaration of independence. 
 The liberation struggle in Algeria inspired a number of similar movements around 
Africa and had created a sense of fear among colonizers of a similar situation erupting in 
their colonies. In 1957, the British colony of the Gold Coast became the first sub-Saharan 
African nation to gain independence in the post-war era. The new nation of Ghana, under 
the radical leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who had attended the Bandung Conference 
even prior to independence, was the first of many decolonization movements across the 
continent.26 In 1960, the year referred to as the ―year of African independence,‖ 
seventeen nations achieved sovereignty and the right to self-governance. Therefore, while 
Chinese support in the late 1950s tended to focus on North Africa, by the early 1960s 
China quickly made its presence known in sub-Saharan Africa as well. 
 This support of independence movements was an important issue in the rhetoric 
surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations far past Bandung. In editorials in 
                                                 
25  Zhou, China and the Asian-African Conference : Documents, 14-15. 
26  Alaba Ogunsawo explains in his book China’s Policy in Africa, 1958-1971 that on the 
first anniversary of Ghana‘s independence in 1958, Zhou En Lai sent a message to Kwame 
Nkrumah stating that the ―Chinese people are very glad to see that new successes have 
continuously been gained by the people of Ghana during the past year in consolidating national 
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the nationalist newspapers People’s Daily and Red Flag, the editorial departments 
published ―Apologists of Neo-Colonialism‖ on October 25, 1963. In the editorial, they 
stated their support of the newly independent nations of Asian, Africa, and Latin 
America, emphasizing that ―The primary and most urgent task facing these countries is 
still the further development of the struggle against imperialism, old and new 
colonialism, and their lackeys.‖27 The editorials also described the political nature of the 
struggle, emphasizing the need for an ―armed struggle,‖ the hallmark of Maoist Marxism. 
Additionally, foreshadowing the importance of the economic relationship that was 
developing between China and many African nations, the editorials stated, ―It is 
important for the newly independent countries to develop their independent economy. 
But this task must never be separated from the struggle against imperialism, old and new 
colonialism, and their lackeys.‖28 
 All of these colonies gaining the right to self-government greatly concerned the 
major players of the Cold War. The United States in particular was adamant against 
allowing key African nations, in terms of geography, natural resources, or population, to 
develop a socialist form of government or establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. While the U.S. did not care as much about the political alignment of smaller 
nations such as Cameroon or Burundi, both considered more ―leftist‖ states immediately 
following their independence, it did care heavily about the political alignment of nations 
such as the Congo. 
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 A State Department telegram on August 6, 1964, illustrates this concern and one 
of the main reasons the Congo was so strategic. In the telegram, sent to the Brussels and 
Leopoldville embassies from Washington, foreign policy advisors discussed the critical 
nature of the situation in the Congo and its importance to the United States and Europe. 
The State Department called the Congo the ―key to Central Africa,‖ as the largest country 
in the region, sharing a border with nine different nations, all with the potential to fall 
under communist influence.29  The idea of the ―domino effect‖ was central in United 
States foreign policy during this period – for example, one need only look to the counties 
of Southeast Asia- and this was a prime example of such a fear. Foreign policy makers 
assumed that if a large, influential nation like the Congo could maintain democratic 
stability, it would influence its small, less influential neighbors in a similar direction. 
The communist infiltration in the Congo differed from the United States officials' 
fear of Soviet influence seen in many international examples. The major concern about 
the Congo by 1964 actually lay in the fear of Chinese influence. In a research 
memorandum by Thomas Hughes, the United States Director of Research and 
Intelligence in the State Department, from August of 1964,  he explained, ―given the 
distance of the Congo from the USSR and Soviet reluctance to become involved in direct 
confrontations with the US, we would not expect any direct Soviet intervention in such 
circumstances.‖30 However, while the Soviet Union remained relatively uninterested in 
the situation in the Congo, the Chinese repeatedly proved their interest.  
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In a speech made before the Banquet of the International Congress of French-
speaking Africa of Georgetown University on 18
 
August 1964, W. Averell Harriman, the 
U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, explained to his audience, ―Guerrilla 
handbooks of Chinese origin have been found in the Congo….The tactics used by the 
rebels show unmistakably Chinese Communist inspiration.‖31 Numerous memos from the 
State Department and officials in the Congo further reflected the fear of Chinese 
communist influence on the rebel factions in the Congo. Foreign policy makers raised 
concerns at the time about the ―Chicoms‖ presence in Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi,  
as well as concerns that the Chinese were training Congolese rebels, in the Congo and 
possibly even in China.32 While the truth of these statements is still debated, it was clear 
that not only was China an increasingly important presence in Africa, but that it also had 
attracted the attention of the West. 
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AFRO-ASIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 1958 
 
In the late 1950s, the United States was concerned with revolutionary and 
subversive activities, and understandably so considering China‘s political rhetoric at both 
Bandung and particularly at the first meeting of the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity 
Organization. However, in reality the relations between China and the third world were 
becoming increasingly focused on economics. Diplomacy was to go hand in hand with 
economic aid and investment, first evidenced at the 1958 meeting of the Asian-African 
Chamber of Commerce. 
An off-shoot of the A.A.P.S.O., the Chamber of Commerce was designed to 
facilitate economic relationships in a mandate by the previous year‘s conference. The 
first meeting of the Chamber was held on December 8, 1958 by the United Arab 
Chamber of Commerce and other similar bodies from A.A.P.S.O. member countries. In a 
Chinese Foreign Ministry description of the conference, the major goals were described 
as: 
(1) To search for a means for the cooperation of Asian-African countries in 
economics, technology, and finance, and to find ways to avoid vicious 
competitions in markets; 
(2) To create a solution for the defrayal of difficulties facing the Asian-African 
countries;  
(3) To discuss the influence of the European markets on Asian countries; 
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(4) To issue the permanent joint body of the Asian-African Chamber of 
Commerce Meeting.33 
Countries such as India, Japan, and Indonesia were allotted certain goals as their specific 
responsibilities, but there were concerns by the China's foreign ministry that any of these 
countries might create difficulties due to their oftentimes precarious relationship with 
China. 
 The separate goals of the Chinese government were clear. In the same 
instructional briefing, they explained that while the majority of nations would attend 
based on their desire to increase international trade and improve their economies, ―We 
think it is of considerate political significance to offer positive support to this purpose so 
as to get the majority of participant on our side.‖ The plan was to reveal the weaknesses 
in ―imperial‖ aid from sources such as the United States and Japan, and then provide an 
alternative in the form of ―selfless aid‖ that the Chinese government provided ―under the 
principle of equity and mutual benefit.‖ In language that was becoming familiar and more 
fine-tuned, they explained, ―We will strive for the promotion of economic development 
of Asian and African countries in the consistent spirit of equity and mutual benefit and 
friendly cooperation.‖34 
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Zhou En-Lai in Africa, 1963-64 
 
Before these economic objectives could implemented the Chinese first had to 
establish the foundation of diplomatic relations. While China‘s support of the 
nationalization of Suez, the national liberation struggle in Algeria, and the conflict in the 
Congo gathered the most international attention, what was truly important to the Chinese 
at this time was the African nations‘ recognition of the government in Peking rather than 
the government in Taipei. Therefore, while the most influential and important event in 
the first ten years of China‘s diplomatic relations with the third world was the 
increasingly economic emphasis through the A.A.P.S.O., the most symbolic was Zhou 
En-Lai‘s trip to Africa in 1963.  
 The face of China‘s foreign policy, along with the foreign minister Chen Yi and 
forty other officials, made the three-month long trip from December of 1963 to February 
of 1964, visiting nine countries, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, 
Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The purpose of this trip was to establish 
diplomatic relations with the nations of Africa, as well as to explain China‘s recent 
opposition to the nuclear test ban treaty, to encourage the meeting of another Bandung, 
and to emphasize China‘s stance on giving economic aid to those countries with which it 
had strong diplomatic ties. China had already demonstrated that it was in fact a ―power 
relevant to Africa‖35 through its participation in the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity 
Organization, and through its support of Egypt, Algeria, and the Congo. In fact, prior to 
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Zhou En Lai‘s trip, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia had 
already established diplomatic relations with Peking. Therefore, much of the trip was 
largely symbolic, and little was actually accomplished in the countries the delegation 
visited. 
 It is also important to note that these were not the first Chinese delegations to 
African nations following the Bandung Conference. The period immediately following 
Bandung ―was followed by Chinese efforts to increase diplomatic, economic and cultural 
contacts.‖36 In 1956 alone, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ethiopia were all  
recipients of cultural missions from the Chinese government. Additionally, China began 
to forge economic ties with African nations, beginning with Egypt, purchasing cotton and 
increasing its economic ties with the nation beyond that of the economic aid given during 
the Suez crisis. Egypt also represents the first African nation to establish diplomatic 
relations with China, and in 1956 the first Chinese embassy in Africa was established in 
Cairo.  
 However, the trip had ―doctrinal importance,‖ observed in the large amount of 
rhetoric produced. Speeches were given at every capital visited, often under the title 
―Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism,‖ and Peking‘s Foreign Language Press 
produced a collection of them. Many of them were also reprinted in newspapers in China. 
The major objectives of the delegation were summarized in a February 6, 1964, editorial 
in the People’s Daily. The seven objectives were described as: 
1) In order to prevent world war, it is necessary to wage an unremitting 
struggle against imperialist policies of aggression and war;  
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2) The contemporary national liberation movement is an important force 
in defense of world peace;  
3) Imperialism and old and new colonialism must be completely liquidated 
in Africa;  
4) Asian-African solidarity must be strengthened with the utmost effort;  
5) …active preparations should be made for a Second Asian-African 
Conference;  
6) Disputes among Asian-African countries should be settled through 
peaceful negotiations on the basis of Asian-African solidarity;  
7) National economies should be developed by mainly relying on one‘s 
own strength supplemented by foreign assistance.37 
While these principles were largely reflective of China‘s aims for the delegation, they did 
not mention some of the more implicit goals that are easily evidenced from the rhetoric of 
the speeches given throughout the trip. 
 Perhaps the best example of rhetoric is a speech given by Zhou at a rally in 
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, on February 3, 1964, which was reprinted in the 
Peking Review on February 14. In this speech, known as the ―Revolutionary Prospects in 
Africa Excellent‖ speech, Zhou returned to the rhetoric of Bandung. He stated, ―In each 
of the African countries we visited, we have deeply felt the African people‘s strong desire 
to promote the unity and solidarity of African countries in order to remove the obstacles 
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caused by the colonialists‘ artificial division of Africa.‖38 This return to the cause of 
anticolonialism re-emphasized its importance as the keystone of China‘s foreign policy 
towards Africa. Zhou also used the opportunity to implicitly implicate the United States 
in acting as a neo-imperialist in Africa, while criticizing former imperial powers: 
The imperialists will of course never be reconciled to their defeat in 
Africa. They do not like to see the African people standing up and 
becoming masters of their own house. Nor do they like to see the 
independent development and prosperity of the African countries. Some 
old colonialists are continuing their bloody suppression of the African 
peoples fighting for independence and freedom; others have resorted to 
neocolonialist tactics in an attempt to maintain their colonial rule; still 
others have again revealed their ferocious features as old colonialists after 
their neo-colonialist tactics were seen through by the masses. They are 
now stepping up their infiltration and expansion in the political, military, 
economic and cultural fields by hypocritical means, trying hard to step 
into the shoes of the old colonialists and place the new emerging African 
countries under their control.39 
While Zhou never outright mentioned the United States, it is obvious that it was his 
intention to incriminate them along with the former formal colonial powers. 
 What is most important about his speech, however, and was the part of the trip 
that held the most importance for future relations between China and African countries, 
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was his promise of economic assistance to those nations with positive diplomatic ties. 
This meant that not only was China standing with African nations in their criticism of 
colonialism and neo-imperialism, but also providing them an alternative when it came to 
economic aid and assistance. In the same speech, Zhou laid out the eight principles of 
economic aid practiced by the Chinese government. These principles included the 
importance of ―equality and mutual benefit in providing aid,‖ China‘s respect for ―the 
sovereignty and independence‖ of the nation receiving the aid, that in giving aid, ―the 
purpose of the Chinese government is not the make the recipient countries dependent on 
China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent 
economic development,‖ and that the when giving any technical assistance, they would 
not leave until citizens of the country receiving the assistance could ―fully master the 
technique.‖40 
 These principles were obviously developed with the problems of colonialism in 
mind. In them, China sought to alleviate many of the major economic critiques of 
colonial rule, as well as the new critiques of neo-colonialism. The promotion of economic 
self-sufficiency had never been on the agenda for colonists, and African nations felt that 
the neo-imperialist powers, which now included the United States, were anxious to keep 
them economically dependent. Therefore, while there was little economic interaction 
between China and the African nations when Zhou gave his speech in Mogadishu, he was 
correct in stating, ―there is no doubt that this mutual aid and economic co-operation will 
continuously expand in scope and increase in quantity.‖41 
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China and Zambia 
 This increase in economic involvement can be seen in the leap from providing aid 
to two African nations in 1962, Ghana and Mali, to entering into ―trade, economic, 
technical, scientific and cultural‖ assistantships with eight countries in 1964.42 The 
increase was largely because China believed that at this time ―Africa appeared to be a 
more promising area of economic activity from the Chinese point of view. Thus as soon 
as an African country granted the PRC diplomatic recognition, it was immediately 
rewarded with economic assistance.‖43 Economic assistance quickly totaled in the 
millions of monetary, food, military, and other forms of tangible aid, with the most 
substantial year being 1970 in which China pledged more than 500 million dollars to 
African countries. 
The amount of aid in 1970 was so substantial because 474 million of those dollars 
were pledged to the building of the TAZARA Railway. Chinese and African workers 
built the TanZam Railway from 1970 to 1975, which runs from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
on the coast of the Indian Ocean, to Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia. The building of the railway 
was of particular importance to Zambia, as the people of the newly independent nation 
needed a route out for their copper, which directly following independence was 95% of 
their exports. However, this route was blocked by conflict from both the west in Angola 
and the south in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.  
However, the Chinese did not wait until they were approached about the railway 
to solicit the new Zambian government. In fact, they did not even wait until Zambia was 
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formally independent to begin reaching out. In June of 1964, He Ying, a member of the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Northern Rhodesia to meet with the new 
members of the soon to be Zambian cabinet. Of the thirteen members of the cabinet, He 
met with ten, including the future president, Kenneth Kaunda. In his telegram report back 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, He described a banquet held by Kaunda in his honor. 
At the banquet He made a speech stating, ―After the independence of North Rhodesia, the 
Chinese government is willing to develop a friendly, cooperative relationship under the 
Bandung Spirit and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and would agree to 
dispatch representatives to participate in their independence ceremony and establish 
diplomatic relationship with them.”44 
The rhetoric was predictable, as were the beginnings of negotiations that 
followed. The plan was the same that is was with any other country the Chinese sought 
diplomatic relations with in the 1960s: ―In the UN, the North Rhodesian representative 
would support the recovery of the lawful seat of China, and there would be no such 
problem of „Two Chinas‟ within the boundary of North Rhodesia.” In return for this 
important international recognition, He explained that “The North Rhodesian government 
hopes that Chinese government would offer aid to the economic construction after its 
independence.”45 A mutually beneficial relationship had seemingly begun.  
Therefore, when a few months later formal independence was granted, the 
Chinese were ready. In a letter to the new President Kaunda on October 26, 1964, two 
days after Northern Rhodesia had been given formal independence as the Republic of 
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Zambia, He Ying expressed his congratulations. However, the letter also expressed ―that 
the Chinese Government is ready immediately to establish diplomatic relations and 
exchange diplomatic representative on ambassadorial level with Republic of Zambia.‖ 
This was of course contingent that ―the Zambian government has the same desire and 
does not have anything to do with the Chiang Kai-Shek clique.‖46 Diplomatic relations 
were established, and in fact China was the first nation to do so and the first to start 
building its embassy in the capital city of Lusaka.  
It was not long before the Zambian government began searching for fiscal and 
tactical support to build a railway out for their copper exports. By 1965, Kaunda and his 
cabinet had begun approaching governments, including the United States and Great 
Britain, as well as the World Bank. For a former British colony and member of the 
Commonwealth, this seemed a logical place to seek out aid and investment. But Kaunda 
also sought funds from another source, China. Although Kaunda repeatedly emphasized 
in Times of Zambia  newspaper articles and editorials that he was looking at all offers to 
build the railway, and downplayed his negotiations with a communist government, it is 
clear that the Chinese were always considered a strong contender for the primary 
investor. 
On August 17, 1965, the Chinese Embassy in Zambia produced a telegraph to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing regarding Kaunda‘s attitude towards the 
construction of the TAZARA railway. It explained that ―Kaunda was hesitating over 
whose aid he should accept‖ and that he hoped the railway could be funded by the World 
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Bank. At this point, the Chinese seemed unsure of how to interpret Kaunda‘s speech and 
actions: 
To avoid pressure from imperialism and colonialism he wants to get 
unconditioned aid from the west, but doesn‟t think the western countries 
are reliable. He also wants to accept the aid from China, but worries about 
the ensuing imperialistic pressure. The contradiction of his thought is 
reflected in the discrepancy of his speech. Certainly there is another 
possibility: he wants to urge the western countries to hurry in honoring 
their promise of aid by claiming to consider aid from China.47 
Soon after this telegraph, on September 28, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Transport and Works sent a letter to the Chinese Embassy in Zambia. He stated, “The 
purpose of this communication is to appraise the Government of the People's Republic of 
China of what is now raking place and to enquirer whether the Government of the 
People's Republic of China would consider participating in the provision of finance for 
the later stages of the project.”48 
 This request was kept quiet for the moment though, and understandably so. In a 
Zambian Foreign Ministry report on Chinese policy in Zambia, they explained, “Nobody 
can doubt that the Chinese do not like our policy of non-alignment....However, in non-
alignment we acknowledge the fact that neither communists nor capitalists are innocent 
of imperialist aggression.”49 All the way up until June of 1967, just a few months before 
the final railway contract was signed, Kaunda repeatedly claimed that “Zambia was not 
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attempting to play off East against West by approaching a number of countries for 
assistance with the project.”50 Yet it seemed to the Chinese that was exactly what he was 
doing, and they did not mind. For, in the end, they received exactly what they wanted in 
return: continuous diplomatic recognition and ardent support of their re-establishment to 
the United Nations. 
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Conclusion 
After copper prices fell in the 1980s, the TAZARA railway fell into disrepair and 
the Zambian economy collapsed. Although the Zambian government is now working to 
diversify the economy, copper prices have risen significantly in the past ten years and 
they are again searching for routes out for their exports. So, in February of 2007, the 
Chinese signed on the rebuild the TAZARA railway, and forgive all previous debts. It is 
this renewal of support, combined with many other such contemporary economic 
involvements throughout the continent that make the study of the development of 
Chinese relations with Africa so important.  
Much has changed internally in China since its participation in the Bandung 
Conference in 1955, including the significant move towards an increasingly capitalistic 
form of economy. However, China's insistence on its equality with the nations of the 
Africa remains the same. In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a surge of Chinese 
interest, aid, and investment across the African continent. Many of the projects and 
partnerships fostered between China and various African nations have been shrouded 
with controversy and concern. Politicians, businessmen, economists, journalists, and 
people whose lives are directly influenced by the Chinese presence in Africa have 
watched these developments with avid attention.
51
 The world certainly sees China as the 
emerging global superpower of the twenty-first century, yet China still refers to itself as a 
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―developing nation.‖ However, despite this conflict of opinion, China‘s strategic self-
depreciation is one of the fundamentals of understanding the history of Chinese foreign 




Appendix I: Chronology 
 
1 October 1949  Establishment of the People‘s Republic of China 
 
14 August 1952  Alfred Sauvy coins the term ―third world‖ 
 
8 May 21 July 1954  Geneva Conference 
 
June 1954   Establishment of ―Panch Shila,‖ or the Five Principles of  
    Peaceful Coexistence 
 
1 November 1954  Beginning of the Algerian War for Independence 
 
6-10 April 1955  Asian Nations Conference 
 
18-24 April 1955  Bandung Conference 
 
29 October 1956  Beginning of the Suez Crisis 
 
6 March 1957 The British colony of the Gold Coast declares 
independence and becomes the independent nation of 
Ghana. 
 
26 December 1957  Founding of the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity 
Organization 
 
1960 ―Year of African Independence.‖ Seventeen African 
nations become independent.  
 
December 1963-   Zhou En Lai‘s trip to Africa 
February 1964  
 
24 October 1964  The British colony of Northern Rhodesia becomes the  
    Independent nation of Zambia. 
 
16 May 1966   Launching of the Cultural Revolution in China 
 
1970- 1975 Building of the TAZARA Railway by China from Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania to Lusaka, Zambia 
 
25 October 1971  Re-establishment of the People‘s Republic of China to the 
    United Nations Security Council 
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Appendix II: Diplomatic Relations between China and Africa 
 
Country Date of Independence A.A.P.S.O. Member? Diplomatic Relations Est. 
Egypt 28 February 1922 Yes 30 May 1956 
 Morocco 2 March 1956 Yes 1 November 1958 
Algeria 21 September 1958 Yes 20 December 1958 
Sudan 1 January 1956  No 4 February 1959 
Guinea 2 October 1958 Yes 4 October 1959 
Ghana 6 March 1957 Yes 5 July 1960 
Mali 22 September 1960 No 27 October 1960 
Somalia 1 July 1960 Yes 14 December 1960 
Congo (K) 30 June 1960 Yes 20 February 1961 
Tanzania 9 December 1961 Yes December 1961 
Uganda 9 October 1962 No 18 October 1962 
Zanzibar 10 December 1963 No 11 December 1963 
Kenya 12 December 1963 Yes 14 December 1963 
Burundi 1 July 1962 No 23 December 1963 
Tunisia 20 March 1956 Yes 10 January 1964 
Congo (B) 15 August 1960 No 22 February 1964 
Central African Republic 13 August 1960 No 29 September 1964 
Zambia 24 October 1964 Yes 31 October 1964 
Benin 1 August 1960 No 12 November 1964 
Mauritania 28 November 1960 No 19 July 1965 
Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968 No 15 October 1970 
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